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TOWARD A JUDICIAL REFORM OF ABORTION LAWS
Motherhood by choice is a woman's right.
Abandoned Pregnancy or Abandoned Child?
No More Lysol, Ether, Quinine, Soap, Coat Hangersl We Demand
Doctorsl'

Such were the signs of protest against abortion laws displayed during a
demonstration last year at the California State Capitol Building. They are
a significant comment on how some women regard their own personal rights
with respect to the function of childbearing. It is also a rather grim and
tragic statement of the means to which women are presently forced to resort
in order to abort an unwanted pregnancy: either crude methods of self-abortion or the risky alternative of an illegal abortionist who often is untrained
and incompetent.2 Today, most states define threat to the mother's life as
the only justifiable ground for a therapeutic abortion, the intentional termination of a pregnancy for medical reasons. 3
THE HISTORY

AND EFFECT OF ABORTION STATUTES

Both the present civil laws and the canon law of the Roman Catholic
Church prohibiting or restricting abortion are comparatively recent innovations. In the Egyptian, Greek, and Roman civilization abortions were approved
and extensively used to implement a "well-ordered population policy."4 However, Christian dogma early came to regard abortion as murder if the fetus
had been infused with a rational soul at the time the abortion was performed.
Ensoulment was equated with the beginning of life and theologians were
then faced with the problem of determining the exact moment of ensoulment
or animation. The church adopted Aristotle's theory that animation occurred
forty days after conception for a male child and eighty or ninety days for a
female. 5 How fetal sex was determined remains unexplained. This concept
of ensoulment was adhered to until 1896 when the distinction between an
animated and nonanimated fetus was abolished and all abortions were henceforth regarded as murder.6 At common law, until 1803, abortion before

1. Monroe, How California's Abortion Law Isn't Working, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1968,

§6 (Magazine), at 10-11.
2. L. LER, ABORTION 64 (1966). One young executive in a savings and loan firm was
found to be moonlighting as an abortionist. St. Petersburg Times (Fla.), Nov. 20, 1968, §A
at 6, col. 1.
3. E. SCHUR, CRIMEs WrrHouT VicrIMs 13 (1965).
4. L. LADmE,
supra note 2, at 76.
5. Id. at 77.
6. Id. at 79. In 1588 Pope Sixtus V declared as murder all abortions occurring at any
period of fetal development. This harsh position can be viewed as a result of the Pope's
program to cleanse the Renaissance church and his extremely severe punishment of any
"sins" connected with sexual intercourse, even to the point of making adultery a hanging
offense. Id.
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quickening (the movement of the fetus, which is often felt by the mother
around the third month of pregnancy) was legal. 7 And in the United States
abortion in the Civil War period was an "established custom," with many
states preserving the old quickening rule even into the twentieth century. 8
What caused the sudden change in attitude toward abortions and the
resulting enactment of statutes forbidding or greatly restricting previous
practices? The puritanical fervor of the late nineteenth century is generally
credited with providing the basic framework of present abortion legislation;
the crusade was generally against any form of sex and thus produced laws
prohibiting birth control, sodomy, and homosexuality.9 This Puritanism was
influenced by Catholic attitudes toward sex and procreation. Sex was regarded as intrinsically evil (lust was the original sin) and the only legitimizing reason for intercourse was procreation, the end of marriage being children. 10 Another Catholic concern was for the child who, without the sacrament of baptism, would die in original sin and be condemned to eternal
punishment." Predictably, today the strongest opposition to abortion comes
from the church groups - in particular, the Catholic Church, as evidenced by
its recent blocking of a reform bill in New York. 1 2 Perhaps another motivation for these restrictive statutes was an interest in protecting women from
"butchery by incompetent, non-medical abortionists."'13 It is very doubtful
that this objective has been achieved.
It is estimated that each year approximately 1,500,000 illegal abortions
are performed in the United States and from 5,000 to 8,000 women die from
such abortions, thus accounting for the majority of maternal deaths.' 4 Yet,
only five states-California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina
-have adopted liberalized abortion statutes. These state statutes, based on
the relevant portions of the Model Penal Code, authorize an abortion if the
pregnancy endangers the physical or mental health of the mother, if the
pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, or (excluding California) if there
is likelihood that the child will be born defective.15 But these laws have not
solved the abortion problem. Studies indicate that the business of criminal

7.

L.

LADER,

supra note 2, at 79; Abortion Symposium, 22

RUTGERS

L. REv. 415, 416

(1968).
8. L. LADER, supra note 2, at 85; Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the
Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L. REv. 730, 731 (1968).
9. L. LADER, supra note 2, at 90; Lucas, supra note 8, at 732.
10. L. LADER, supra note 2, at 81; G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMIINAL LAW 53 (1957).
11. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 153.
12. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1969, §L at 40, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1969, §L at 31, col.

4.
13. L. LADER, supra note 2, at 92.
14. L. LADER, supra note 2, at 2-3.
15. Progress Report on Liberalized Abortion, TIMtE, Nov. 15, 1968, at 61. The clause
permitting abortions if there was a great likelihood that the child would be born defective
was deleted from the California bill as a concession to Governor Reagan and the Catholic
Church in a successful effort to save the bill. Monroe, supra note 1, at 17.
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abortions still thrives. Legal abortions are obtained primarily by the affluent. 6
In California, the estimated illegal abortion rate of 100,000 per year remains
unaffected; the prohibitive cost of a legal abortion (including doctor, psychiatrist, and hospital charges), which averages from 600 to 700 dollars and
which can go as high as 1,800 dollars, effectively precludes the poor from
obtaining abortions.17 Supporters of a liberalized law in California are dissatisfied and question the worth of the new law; they fear that it may prevent
better bills from being passed. "The small reform may become the enemy of
the great one." '
Over the past twenty-five years the number of hospital abortions performed annually in the United States has been drastically reduced from 30,000
to 8,000 revealing an overanxious response on the part of hospital boards to
the infinitely remote possibility of criminal prosecution. 9 Even in California
many hospitals have unstated quotas for abortions or to avoid being labelled
an "abortion mill" refuse to allow any abortions. Such a public image
would be adverse publicity and thus would have dire financial consequences
20
for the hospital.
In 1962, the American Law Institute proposed abortion reform measures
in its Model Penal Code. The proposed reforms would allow abortions if the
pregnancy threatened to impair the mental or physical health of the mother,
if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or if there was a possibility
that the child would be born with grave mental or physical defects. 21 But
because of the highly controversial nature of this subject and the reluctance
of legislators to take a public position on abortion reform, the probability of
legislative reform in many states is virtually nonexistent.22 Dr. Robert E. Hall,
President of the Association for the Study of Abortion, Inc., has stated that
meaningful and effective reform cannot realistically be expected from "our
politically minded, church dominated state legislatures.."23 Thus, some reform
advocates regard the courts as the only hope for reform or repeal. Progress
will perhaps be similar to that of birth control and legislative reapportionment: the public will demand a change, the states will take no significant
16. Progress Report on Liberalized Abortion, supra note 15, at 61.
and the Law, NEwswEEK, Dec. 2, 1968, at 82.
17. Monroe, supra note 1, at 10, 18.
18. Monroe, supra note 1, at 20.
19. L.L.an,
supra note 2, at 24.
20. Monroe, supra note 1, at 19.

21.

MODEL PENAL CODE

See also Abortion

§230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

22. One example is the attempt at abortion reform in Florida. The present law permits abortion only to preserve the life of the mother. FLA. STAT. §782.10 (1967). A bill
based on the model bill of the American Law Institute passed the house. St. Petersburg
Times (Fla.), April 29, 1969, §A at 1, col. 6. However, the bill was defeated in a senate
committee. St. Petersburg Times (Fla.), May 16, 1969, §B at 1, col. 7. The original outlook
for the bill was quite unfavorable although a recent UPI poll indicated that the bill had
gained support among the legislators. A similar bill was introduced in the 1967 legislature,
but it was killed in a house committee after narrowly passing in the senate. St. Petersburg
Times (Fla.), March 2, 1969, §B at 2, col. I.
23. Monroe, supra note I, at 20.
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steps, and ultimately the courts will assume the responsibility. A recent survey by the National Opinion Research Center found that a "majority of
Americans, including Roman Catholics, favored liberalizing the abortion
laws."24 Thus, public interest in and demand for abortion reform seems
imminent.25
This note is concerned with judicial reform of abortion statutes, with a
reexamination of the interests of the state and the legal rights of the involved
parties: the fetus, the couple, and the doctor.
LEGAL RECOGNITION AND STATUS OF THE FETUS

A currently employed justification of present abortion laws is protection

of the fetus as a human being infused with a rational soul. The point at
which life begins will always be a subject of philosophical and religious discussion and a matter of personal and moral judgment. That there is disagreement as to when life begins may reveal that such a determination is ultimately fixed by an individual's own value choices. If legal protection is to be
afforded to the fetus, it must be determined that the fetus is a legally recognized human being. However, the death of a fetus before the twentieth week
does not require a death certificate in any state; a fetus, up to the fifth month
of gestation, may be disposed of without the usual formalities required for
the disposition of a human corpse .26 Until the fifth month, state laws apparently do not recognize the existence of a human being within the embryo.
Until recently, prenatal tort recovery has not been allowed.27 Obviously,
those states denying recovery for prenatal torts do not recognize the existence
of a human being in the embryo. The states now allowing recovery generally
specify that the fetus must have been viable (able to live apart from the
mother) at the time of injury.2s Here, viability, which occurs around the
seventh month of pregnancy, appears to determine the point at which the
law recognizes the fetus as a human being. Two or three states allowing
prenatal tort recovery have retained the requirement of quickness (the movement of the fetus that the mother feels), which occurs around the third month
of gestation. 29 The viability distinction, which is difficult to apply, has been
abandoned by nine jurisdictions. 30 However, the unlimited recovery situation
can be distinguished from abortion because in the tort case the interest of

24. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1967, §L at 40, col. 3.
25. Lucas, supra note 8, at 735-36.
26. H. ROSEN, ABORTION IN AMERICA xvii (1967); The Gainesville Sun (Fla.), April 16,
1969, §A at 5, col. 1. The remains of the fetus are usually flushed down the toilet or
thrown out with the garbage.
27. W. PROSSER, Torts §56, at 354 (1964).
28. Id. at 356; Note, The Case of the PrenatalInjury, 15 U. FLA. L. REv.527, 538 (1963).
Florida adopted the viability rule for purposes of the wrongful death statute in Stokes v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 27, at 356.

30. Id. at 356. California, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See also Note, supra note 28, at 539.
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the mother and the fetus are identical whereas in the abortion case the interests are antagonistic.31
Recent developments prohibiting tort actions for wrongful birth 2 are
inconsistent with the trend permitting recovery for prenatal injuries. Wrongful birth is a novel action in which a child sues to recover the damages of
being born illegitimate, deformed, or deprived of a natural home. The
claim is based on a tort (fraud or negligence) that either caused or did not
prevent his birth. In Zepada v. Zepada,3 3 a suit by an adulterine bastard
against his natural father for fraudulently inducing his mother into sexual
intercourse was dismissed; in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,3 4 the court dismissed a
malpractice suit by a malformed child against a doctor who failed to inform
the parents of the possibility of having a deformed child due to rubella
(German measles) during the first trimester of pregnancy. And in Williams
v. State,35 a suit by a bastard of a mentally deficient mother was ultimately
dismissed. Because of the alleged negligence of the defendant in protecting
the mother she was raped by a fellow patient at a state institution. In all
three cases there was an obvious instance of either negligence on the part of
the doctor or of fraud, but recovery was denied. Most likely, considerations
of public policy and problems of remoteness of the tort in relation to the
plaintiff influenced the decisions, but in these cases the fetus is not accorded
the same legal rights and treatment as a human being. With certain limited
exceptions, such as interspousal immunity, a human being theoretically may
recover for all torts against him. Again, the law apparently does not recognize
the fetus as a complete, full human being.
A close scrutiny of present abortion laws reveals that they do not vest the
fetus with any legal interest and are not actually designed to protect the
child from the person causing its death because the mother is rarely made a
felon or accomplice in such statutes.38 She is virtually never prosecuted. In
fact, some statutes do not require the death of the fetus or pregnancy of the
woman to convict the abortionist.3 7 Thus, an abortionist could be convicted
for attempting to abort an unpregnant woman or for an unsuccessful attempt.
The statutes are principally directed at protecting the woman from the quack
abortionist. Further, the "killing" of a fetus is labled manslaughter, not
murder, although abortion contains the elements of premeditation and deliberation. Under Florida law it is manslaughter to abort a quick fetus,
while abortion of a fetus before quickening subjects the offender to a

31.

Note, Abortion Legislation: The Need for Reform, 20

VAND. L. REv.

1313, 1317

(1967).
32. Florida prohibits actions for wrongful birth. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Ist
D.CA. Fla. 1967).
33. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
34. 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
35. 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1964), revd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d
343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).

36. See FLA. STAT. §§782.09, .10, 797.01 (1967).
37. Note, supra note 31, at 1319.
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maximum of seven years imprisonment or 1,000 dollars penalty." The degree of culpability depends on the degree of development of the fetus.
The law does not recognize that from the time of conception there is
potential life, a potential human being, in the womb. Nevertheless, the law
has never attempted to define the precise moment at which life begins.
Generally, legal rights are not afforded to the fetus until the seventh month,
when viability is attained or, at the earliest, quickening. A fetus possesses
the right of inheritance but only if born alive.39
In summary, the fetus is not afforded all or the same legal rights given
human beings as revealed by a consideration of the structure of present
abortion statutes and the recent wrongful birth cases. Since abortions are
considered too dangerous after the first three or four months and thus not
40
normally performed after the first trimester even by quack abortionists,
most abortions are performed during the period of gestation in which the
law does not give the fetus the full status of a human being.
The redefining of death required by organ transplants may provide a
basis for the first clear, legal definitions of life and death. The concept of
death as the absence of heart or respiratory activity has been superseded by
the concept of a nonfunctioning brain.4 1 In both medical and legal circles,
the absence of any brain activity as evidenced by a flat electroencephalogram
(EEG) has been accepted as a reliable indication of death.42 By analogy, the
beginning of life could be defined as the time at which the fetal brain begins
to function and produce brain waves. By placing electrodes on the maternal
abdomen over the fetal brain, it has been discovered that the fetal brain does
not produce an EEG reading until the seventh month. 43 Under the suggested
definition of life, abortions would not constitute a "killing" of a human
being, since abortions are not performed in the seventh month or last trimester of pregnancy.
It is possible that with the refinement and development of modern technology, an earlier indication of life such as an EEG reading earlier in the
period of gestation might be discovered. Another possibility is that courts
will avoid the difficult and tricky task of defining the moment life begins
and base their decisions on other grounds, perhaps involving constitutional
rights, leaving the rather difficult determination of when life begins to the
conscience of the couple involved.

Compare FLA. STAT. §§782.09, .10 (1967), with FLA. STAT. §797.01 (1967).
Abortion Symposium, supra note 7, at 433.
40. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 230 n.7.
41. Biorck, When Is Death?, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 484, 490 (1968). The First International
Transplant Symposium in Madrid has agreed to define death "as the moment when the
brain ceases to perform its vital functions and fails to react to medical stimuli." St. Petersburg Times, July 20, 1969, §A at 13, col. 1.
42. What and When Is Death?, 204 J.A.M.A., May 6, 1968, at 220. See also Biorck, note
41 supra; Heartening, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1968, at 126.
43. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 231.
38.
39.
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THE RIGHT To

LIFE

My feeling is that the fetus . . . is simply a group of specialized cells
that do not differ materially from the other cells.... And I feel that if
it is going to be for the welfare of the adult individual, and for society
in certain instances, we are justified in eliminating those cells. . . . If
one can justify shooting a burglar who enters your room, or going to
war and shooting an enemy, one can certainly justify the elimination
of some cells, which . . . have not yet become a human being, but
44
simply have the potentialities of life.
Proponents of present abortion laws argue that the fetus has a fundamental
and constitutional right to life regardless of its legal status and recognition.
Such an approach, in its emphasis on the quantitative, neglects the qualitative
aspect of life. Life does not mean "immediate survival. It is a long-range
process dependent upon health, both physical and mental." 4 5 Society should
not be concerned simply with saving the life of a fetus but also with insuring
that opportunity is provided for that life to develop in a meaningful and selffulfilling manner. Rubella during the first trimester of pregnancy creates a fifty
per cent risk that the infant will be born blind, deaf, deformed, or mentally
retarded. 6 Does society have the right to condemn a child to that kind of life?
depends on the attitude
There is no conclusive answer to that question -it
of the parents, their feelings about the possibility of having a deformed
child and their own security, both financial and emotional. The answer
should not be determined or commanded by the state.
The process of socialization in the infant depends upon his acceptance
by a mother figure. 47 An unwanted child may develop acute problems due
to lack of emotional security and parental love. Such children often display
antisocial behavior as a subtle means of developing self-protective barriers.
Juvenile delinquency is sometimes a desperate attempt to gain attention and
concern that was not available at home; often it is just the manifestation of
a constant fear and hatred of others, since self-acceptance and love were not
taught at home. 48 Planned parenthood is within the best interests of society
whose primary concern and responsibility should be that no child is born
unwanted, uncared for, and unloved.
THE RIGHTS OF THE COUPLE

Clearly no state is able to command the act of conception. Birth control
has been declared by the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut to lie "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Abortion Symposium, supra note 7, at 436.
H. RoSEN, supra note 26, at 300.
L. LADnR, supra note 2, at 36.
H. ROSEN, supra note 26, at 271.
Id. at 250.
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constitutional guarantees." 49 But once the two cells have come together,
should any state have the power to force the women, over her objections, to
bring the pregnancy to term? Griswold protected a couple's interest in
planning a family without state interference. Abortion can be an important
aspect of family planning. The Court is concerned with the marital relationship, "intimate to the degree of being sacred," and with a "right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights."50 The abortion statutes are a denial of the
couple's right to freedom of belief and religion for the statutes require the
couple to believe that the fetus is a human being regardless of their own
personal, religious, or philosophical views on the matter.
Bearing a child against one's will is an affront to personal dignity and an
infringement of personal liberty. In recent years the Supreme Court has repeatedly increased protection of the individual from governmental compulsion, thereby not only expanding the right to privacy but also enlarging the
concept of human dignity. 51 One example is the line of cases expanding
protection available to the accused in the criminal process.5 2 Another example, the recent trend among state courts of recognizing mental distress
as a cause of action, is also a manifestation of the increasing concern with
human dignity.5 3 As Mr. Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Gris-

wold stated, the ninth amendment indicates that fundamental personal rights
exist that are not expressly enumerated in the Bill of Rights.54 In Trop v.
Dulles,5 Mr. Chief Justice Warren explicitly recognized that the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man." 56 He stressed that such a concept is "not static" but "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society. ' ' 57 A mature civilization is able to respect and therefore
to allow greater diversity of opinion because it promotes individuality.
To deny a woman control over her own body is reminiscent of an age
when women were deprived of any legal rights. In fact, a majority of Supreme
Court Justices in Mapp v. Ohio recognized that the fourth amendment created a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully
and particularly reserved to the people."5' 8 This right to privacy is not dependent on the marital status. Abortion, the ultimate means of birth control, should be protected by this constitutional right to privacy and not restricted to the marital couple. Thus, it would be an individual and private
choice for the parties involved. Such an approach is approved by religious
49.
50.
51.
52.

381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
Id. at 250.
Lucas, supra note 8, at 757.
E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

53.

Note, Torts: Dignity as a Legally Protectable Interest, 46 N.C.L. REv. 205, 210

(1967).
54. 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965).
55.

356 U.S. 86 (1958).

56. Id. at 100.
57. Id. at 101.
58. 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
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leaders and abortion experts, such as the Association for the Study of Abortion.a59 As Rabbi Margolies of New York has eloquently stated: 60
Until a child is actually born into this world . . . it does not belong
to society nor has it been accepted into any faith. Its existence is purely
and entirely the business and concern of its parents, whether they are
married or not.
There are several cases pending in New York and California to test the
present abortion statutes.6 1 In a recent California case, Shively v. The Board
of Medical Examiners,62 a superior court held that a woman had a constitutional right to an abortion and that abortion statutes were an infringement
of the fourteenth and eighth amendments to the United States Constitution.
In Shively, a prominent San Franciscan gynecologist was temporarily suspended for aborting women who had contacted German measles during early
pregnancy. Another case on appeal to the California supreme court was
People v. Belous, 63 which involved the same issues, but here a doctor was
convicted of giving a patient a telephone number through which she could
arrange a safe but illegal abortion. The California supreme court ruled the
abortion statute under which Dr. Belous was convicted to be invalid. The
court held that the law was so vague as to be unconstitutional, and that the
law was an improper denial of a woman's fundamental right to determine
whether to bear children.* The statute in question was replaced by more
liberal legislation in 1967. Soon the Supreme Court will face the decision of
whether to adjudge the basic constitutionality of all abortion statutes.Griswold is the only indicator of what that decision might be, that is, that
abortion lies within the penumbra of privacy emanating from the Bill of
Rights or that the right to an abortion is a fundamental right protected from
governmental infringement by the ninth amendment.
Another undesirable aspect of present abortion statutes is that they are
economically and racially discriminatory. The woman of means can obtain
better illegal services. Not only does she have the ability to pay for a safe,
illegal abortion but she also usually has the assistance of a reputable doctor
who can refer her to a competent abortionist.65 It is estimated that private
59. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1968, §L at 77, col. 1.
60. L. LAD-R, ABORTION 68 (1966).
61. Monroe, How California's Abortion Law Isn't Working, N. Y. Times, Dec. 29,

1968, §6 (Magazine), at 20.
62. No. 590333 (Super. Ct. Cal., Sept. 25, 1968).
63. Monroe, supra note 61, at 19.
EDrroR's Nor: The case was decided and other material was published after this
note had gone to press. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969). See also
United States v. Vuitch, 38 U.S.L.W. 2275 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 1969; Constitutional Rights,
TiME, Sept. 19, 1969, at 66; N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1969, §L at 66, col. 4.

64. Monroe, supra note 61, at 19-20. However, the Supreme Court might defer to the
interests of the state as it did in Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), cert.

denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
65. E. Scmm, CQuAms WrrHouTr VIcrMs O, 32 (1965).
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patients get hospital abortions four times as often as ward patients. 66 The
principal victims of abortion deaths, members of deprived minority groups,
cannot afford a trip to Japan, Mexico, or Puerto Rico, 6 or the expensive procedure involved in obtaining a legal, hospital abortion. The small group
granted abortions legally is elite, generally well educated, wealthy, and counseled by influential physicians.6 8 Many private hospitals have policies that discriminate against the poor by sending indigent mothers to county or state hospitals for abortions.69 Approximately fifty per cent of maternal deaths among
New York Negroes and Puerto Ricans are attributable to improper abortions.70
Another form of discrimination is practiced against the single girl who has
much less chance than a married woman of obtaining an abortion. 71 Such
a de facto discrimination is grossly unfair and perhaps some day will be
held to be an infringement of the equal protection of the law afforded by
the fourteenth amendment.
Some present means of contraception actually induce abortions, but women
using such means have not been prosecuted for illegal abortions. The intrauterine device (IUD), a plastic or stainless steel coil inserted into the uterus,
72
prevents the fertilized ovum from implanting in the lining of the uterus.
The hormone estrogen, used in several birth control pills, is also believed to
inhibit implantation of the fertilized ovum. 7 3 Another potential challenge

is the almost completely developed "morning after" or "abortion" pill that
is taken after intercourse and "kills" the fertilized ovum by preventing im74

plantation.

One method of abortion now used by many doctors is practically impossible to detect, and the threat of prosecution is therefore remote.7 5 The physician simply punctures with a blunt instrument the amniotic sac that surrounds the fetus; in a few days the pregnant woman develops an infection
and is admitted into the hospital by her physician with a diagnosis of incomplete, spontaneous abortion. The abortion is then completed by a hospital physician. It is medically impossible to prove that such a miscarriage was
actually induced and not spontaneous. The only means of proof would be
the testimony of the woman who invariably is a reluctant witness if her
abortion was successful and free from serious threat to her life. This re-

66. Hall, His Birth Without Permission, SATURDAY REv., Dec. 7, 1968, at 78.
67. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Administration

of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.G.L. REv. 730, 736 (1968).

68. E. SCHUR, supra note 65, at 30.
69. Abortion and the Law, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1968, at 82.
70. Monroe, supra note 61, at 10.
71. E. SCHUR, supra note 65, at 22.
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luctance is partially caused by a fear of the publicity that would ensue from
her testimony.
These unprosecuted abortions are not examples of selective law enforcement but rather are illustrations of the increasing difficulty of enforcing
abortion statutes because of the development of more sophisticated means of
aborting. They also are an example of the inconsistency of American attitudes toward abortion. While the United States is exporting IUD's to India
and encouraging their use there, this abortifacient is technically illegal in the
United States.78 No public outrages or cries of "baby killers" met the introduction of the IUD. Perhaps the lesson is that means of abortion that are
more subtle, silent, and removed from public awareness do not bother the
American conscience. But to act in a very obvious and public manner as to
amend a statute involves a difficult and sometimes unpopular choice and
responsibility.
THE RIGHTS OF THE PHYSIClAN

The courts have repeatedly emphasized that the medical profession has a
unique right to establish the standards for physicians practicing in the community.1 7

The state certainly has a right to set the prerequisites for a license

to practice within the state, but it seems incongruous to allow the state to
tell a physician how to treat his patient78 By contrast, in states having integrated bars, the state bar association is permitted to determine not only the
prerequisites for admission into practice but also the standards of practice.
The present abortion statutes prohibit the physician from exercising.his responsibility to care for the total patient in her socio-economic environment.
In essence, they are an invasion of the privacy that should be accorded the
doctor and his patient. As Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher, President of Planned
Parenthood-World Population, has said:19
Finally, I want the abortion law reformed so that doctors may practice
medicine in the spirit of the World Health Organization definition of
health, that is, "a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, not only the absence of illness and disease."
In Shively,80 the court recognized that aborting-a woman who had contacted rubella in the first trimester was an accepted medical practice taught
at the state medical schools and routinely practiced by licensed physicians
in and around the San Francisco area. Implicit in this holding is the court's
recognition that abortion is a concern solely of the individual involved and
the physician performing the operation. The standard evolved by the
medical profession in this area might involve a moral choice (that is, that no
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

L. LADER, supra note 60, at 138. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
W. PRossaa, ToRTs §32, at 168 (1964).
Note, What Did Griswold Do for Doctor.s?, 6 J. FAMILY LAW 371, 375 (1966).
Abortion Symposium, 22 RUTGERS L. REY. 415, 421 (1968).
Shively v. Board of Medical Examiners, No. 590333 (Super. Ct. Cal., Sept. 25, 1968).
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woman should be forced to bear a severely deformed child) but other
medical standards also have moral implications. For example, the redefinition of death involves a preference for prolonging an otherwise active life
with insertion of a new heart over prolonging an unconscious and "vegetable"
life by artificial means of respiration and heart pumping. With the development of cytogenic diagnosis, whereby such hereditary aberrations of a young
fetus as Mongolism, hemophilia, and muscular dystrophy can be detected by
examining the amniotic fluid, abortions based on such chromosonal analysis
may become an accepted medical practice.8 1 Perhaps some of the responsibility lies with the medical profession. It should assert its right to give complete and unhampered treatment to its patients and to establish its own
standards. Two hospitals in Buffalo, New York, have nearly quadrupled the
number of abortions performed from fifteen per year in the 1943-1949 period to
fifty-five in the 1960-1964 period.82 Their policies reflect a broad interpretation of the law since most of their abortions are performed for psychogenic
reasons (emotional, social, and economic pressures), but they remain unprosecuted. No longer can other hospitals and doctors continue to hide behind
a rigid and antiquated interpretation of the law. If they are truly concerned
with the welfare of their patients, they have a duty to challenge such laws.
SOCIETAL INTERESTS

The abortion problem is solely a moral problem. It is impossible to
demonstrate a social policy supporting the present statutes imposing
criminal sanctions for abortions. Abortions do not create widespread
social insecurity as murder or other unlawful homicides do. The possibility of abortion does not lead to increased promiscuity in the "age
of the pill," nor need we worry about the preservation of the race when
83
overpopulation is an important world problem.
Present abortion statutes do not rest upon any concern for public security
as do the laws against murder, but are founded on ethico-religious grounds, in
particular a puritanical morality. The high illegal abortion rate reveals two
facts: women and their partners cannot be deterred from sexual relations by
the fear that if the woman becomes pregnant she will be forced to bear the
child; 84 and women will resort to an abortion in a back alley if they are
denied one in a hospital. 85
One argument for retaining the present laws is to discourage premarital
sexual relations. But, ironically, the majority of illegal abortions are performed on married women between the ages of thirty and forty, who have
a family of two or more children and who have conceived by their husbands.8 6
81. Valenti, His Right To Be Normal, SATURDAY REV., Dec. 7, 1968, at 77-78.
L. LADFR, supra note 60, at 150-51.
83. Abortion Symposium, supra note 79, at 429.
84. D. SMITH, ABORTION AND THE LAW 23 (1967).
85. Hall, supra note 66, at 79.
86. D. SMITH, supra note 84, at 73.
82.
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This argument is also discredited by the availability of birth control pills
to single girls. The fallacy of the belief that morality can be legislated should
have been realized with the failure of the Volstead Act to instill principles
of temperance in a large segment of the American population. 7 The moral
policy prohibiting premarital sex ignores the medical fact that it is biologically difficult and unnatural to abstain from sexual relations while one is at
a high emotional and sexual level for approximately five to ten years, from
the commencement of dating to marriage.88 The fact that a disturbed, unmarried teenager in the hospital for her third child was not aborted "may
be a 'moral triumph' but it is neither a medical nor a social one."8 9
An experimental policy of abortion on demand in Communist countries
and in Japan proves conclusively that the system is not just an effective instrument for family planning but it also virtually eliminates the business of
illegal abortions and its inherent dangers. 90 In view of the explosive growth
rate in Latin America and India, where an endless cycle of poverty envelops
the poor, who invariably have the largest families, this means of birth control is a practical and urgent necessity. This is particularly true since the
illiterate poor often cannot use more sophisticated means of birth control
such as the pill. The 1967 English abortion statute has one advantage over
the liberalized American laws: the pregnant woman's actual or foreseeable
environment can constitute a "social reason" for allowing an abortion. 91
This law gives the poor greater access to legal abortions since economic
hardship is included in the definition of "social reason."
The moral question involved in any abortion policy was dismissed by a
92
Japanese official this way:
A people who have had the sublime opportunity of experiencing firsthand the full expression of modern war do not appear too compunctious
over the removal of a few grams of fetal protoplasm from the uterus.
And, ironically, a Communist rather than a Western official uttered this
democratic phrase: "One cannot speak of equal rights of women ... if they
93
are not allowed to determine the number of children they shall have."
In the past, American society has not demonstrated any desire or willingness to help the woman with the problem of unwanted pregnancy. The community, especially if it plans to restrict the availability of abortions, has a
responsibility to meet the difficulties that motivate women to abort. In 1939,
Denmark established Mothers Aid Centers that, staffed by social-gynecological-

87.

L. LADER, supra note 60, at 93.

P. GEBHARD, PREGNANCY, BIRTH, AND ABORTION 30 (1958).
89. D. SMrrH, supra note 84, at 69.
90. L. LADER, supra note 60, at 131.
91. Hall, supra note 66, at 79. One example of "social reason" is economic deprivation
to existing children.
92. E. ScHum, supra note 65, at 54.
93. L. IAnza, supra note 60, at 131.
88.
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